主讲人：丁婷婷

时间：2021年12月17日（周五）上午10：00

地点：腾讯会议ID：931314235

题目：Waiting for the Right Offer: Laboratory Evidence on How News Affects Bargaining and the Market for Lemons

主讲人简介：丁婷婷，美国纽约大学经济学博士，现任上海财经大学经济学院副教授，博士生导师。主要研究领域为实验经济学、行为经济学及微观经济理论。近年来在Economic Journal、Games and Economic Behavior等期刊上发表论文，主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金和面上项目。曾担任Management Science, AEJ: Microeconomics, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, European Economic Review等期刊的匿名审稿人。

摘要: We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand if gradual exogenous revelation of sellers’ private information influences how trades occur in both competitive market and bilateral bargaining settings where a static lemon condition holds. Our experiments implement the Daley and Green (2012, 2020) models and we vary the number of buyers and quality of information across treatments. In both settings buyers benefit from information revelation since it reduces the likelihood that low quality sellers continue to mimic high quality sellers, although only in the bilateral bargaining do buyers respond differently to the quality of information. Moreover, information revelation does not improve efficiency in either setting since buyers tend to wait for more news signals, delaying trade.  While there is quantitative deviation in the rate of experimentation between Daley and Green (2020) and our experimental results, we show that introducing inequality averse preference can diminish the gap markedly.