主讲人：王湘红
题目：Absolute versus Relative:Asymmetric Framing and Feedback in a Heterogeneous-Endowment Public Goods Game
时间：2021年6月18日 15:00
地点：邵逸夫科学馆第五会议室; 腾讯会议ID：501207098
主讲人简介：中国人民大学经济学院教授。在美国卡耐基梅隆大学获公共政策与管理博士学位。主要研究兴趣包括行为与实验经济学，公共政策，收入分配，消费行为。研究成果曾发表在Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Development Studies,China Agricultural and Economic Review, 《世界经济》，《金融研究》 等学术刊物上,并曾多次获得优秀论文奖。 主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目。世界经济论坛全球程序理事会第一届行为分会委员，世界经济论坛未来理事会委员。现任中国行为与实验经济学论坛（ChinaBEEF）秘书长，Economic and Political Studies副主编。
摘要：Individual contributions to public goods can be framed as absolute amounts or as relative proportions of endowments. We examine the effect of asymmetric framing and feedback on cooperation level when group members are heterogeneously endowed. We develop a reference-dependent theory in which group members use absolute or relative contribution level of others as a reference point in their contribution decisions. The theoretical results show that relative framing increases contribution of high-endowment type more than the absolute framing, while the opposite is true for the low-endowment type. Therefore, the group contribution level is highest when high-income members are framed with relative metrics and low-income members are framed with absolute metrics. We test our theory by conducting a laboratory experiment where players with heterogeneous endowments play the public goods game in groups of 4 members. We employ a 4 by 2 design where the framing can be either uniform (absolute or relative for all players) or flexible (different for players with different endowment levels) and there can be either no feedback or feedback on the highest contribution among group members. Experimental results confirm most of the basic treatment effects while also challenge some of the flexible framing effects. Our study, from both theoretical and experimental perspectives, contributes to a better understanding of how endowment, framing, and feedback separately and jointly affect individual play in public goods provision.
