主讲人：Di Feng

题目：Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems

时间：2021年6月3日 16：00

地点：邵逸夫科学馆401

主讲人简介：Di Feng received the M.A. in Economics from Yokohama National University and M.Res. in Economics from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in 2016 and 2018, respectively. Currently, he is working for his Ph.D. degree in Economics at HEC University of Lausanne. His research field covers decision theory, game theory and operations research, with a particular interest in market/mechanism design.

Abstract: We consider multiple-type housing market problems as introduced by Moulin (1995) and study the relationship between strict strong Nash equilibria and the strict core (two solution concepts that are defined in terms of the absence of weak blocking coalitions). We prove that for lexicographically separable preferences, the set of all strict strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation game, induced by a strictly core-stable mechanism, is a subset of the strict core, but not vice versa, i.e., there are strict core allocations that cannot be implemented via strict strong Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1). This result can be extended to a more general set of preference domains that satisfy strict core non-emptiness and a minimal preference domain richness assumption (Theorem 2).