时间：2021年4月22日 15：30

地点：邵逸夫科学馆第五会议室及腾讯会议号455324962

题目：Preventive Wars: Experimental Evidence

主讲人简介：黄凌波， 南京审计大学泽尔腾经济学实验室助理教授，英国诺丁汉大学经济学博士。主要研究方向是人类合作与竞争的行为以及机制设计，资源再分配的公平和社会选择问题，慈善行为以及机制设计。研究成果发表于Economic Journal、Management Science、Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization等期刊。

内容摘要：We study the effect of power shift and commitment on the risk of preventive wars in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, a rising state makes a demand while a declining state decides whether to accept or fight. A power shift occurs between stages in which the rising state’s probability of winning the fight becomes higher in the next stage. When neither state could commit to future policy, the declining state would have an incentive to initiate the preventive war in the first stage out of the fear that the rising stage has an incentive to renege on the announcement of future demand. We find experimental evidence that preventive wars occur less frequently when the rising state has the commitment power but not when the declining state has that power. Furthermore, even when neither state has the commitment power, communication and repeated interaction decreases the risk of preventive wars.