主讲人：郑捷

题目：Male, Female, or No Comment? Gender Information Disclosure in Trusting and Reciprocating

时间：2020年12月8日 14:00

地点：邵逸夫科学馆东二层第五会议室

主讲人简介：郑捷，清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授，博士生导师，清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任，国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编，Research in Economics副编。现为中国信息经济学会常务理事，中国微观经济理论论坛学术委员会委员，中国行为与实验经济学论坛学术委员会委员，American Committee on Asian Economic Studies执行理事。研究领域包括信息经济学、产业经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠利他等行为问题，通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体行为、多方互动、市场均衡。先后主持多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。已有研究工作已发表于American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名国际期刊，且有部分工作被收录入实验研究方法权威工具书Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology。曾获"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"，2016-2018连续三年获"中国信息经济学青年创新奖"。

Abstract:When interacting with others, individuals are sometimes known to condition their decisions on gender characteristics of the other person. In this study, we examine the effect of gender, and information disclosure about gender, on decisions about giving and reciprocating in a laboratory experiment. Treatments vary by the type of reciprocity tested (direct, indirect) and the information conditions (no information, imposed information, self-disclosed). Direct reciprocity conditions combined with imposed gender information leads to the greatest surplus generated. Notably, in the self-disclosed gender information condition, when subjects declined to reveal their gender, transfers from the other player were lowest. Thus, providing an option to make no comment about one’s own gender potentially harms an individual through the decisions made by others towards them. These findings could have important implications in the design of gender information collection and disclosure policies in a variety of settings.