题目：A Theory of Divide-and-Rule: Kleptocracy and Its Breakdown

演讲人：Xuezheng CHEN Department of Economics，University of Warwick

时间：2013年3月21日（周四）16:30—17:30

地点：邵逸夫科学馆513

摘要：

How do non-democratic regimes, especially kleptocracies, manage to sustain their rule over long periods? In this paper, I develop a theory of divide-and-rule, explaining how kleptocracies can be sustained in equilibrium by implementing a strategy of divide-and-rule and the resulting consequences. This paper shows how this strategy is successfully implemented by a kleptocrat, who is able to play one group of citizens against another, and explore the extent to which this is robust to a society with any number of citizen groups. When there are more than two citizen groups, a small number of citizen groups may benefit from the divide-and-rule strategy, while the vast majority will be heavily exploited under the discriminatory redistribution policies. Therefore, sharp economic and political inequalities between the citizen groups may arise because of the divide-and-rule strategy. What is more, this paper examines two cases in which this strategy may fail and the kleptocracy will break down. Several results are obtained in this paper, and applied in the illustration of some real world cases.