时间：2024年3月14日15点

地点：邵逸夫科学馆401

题目：Is It What You Say or How You Say It?

内容摘要：This study investigates the mechanisms driving the effectiveness of free-form communication in promoting cooperation within a sequential social dilemma game. We hypothesize that the self-constructing nature of free-form communication enhances the sincerity of messages and increases the disutility of dishonoring promises. Our experimental results demonstrate that free-form messages outperform both the restricted promises and a treatment wherein subjects can select and use previously constructed free-form messages. Interestingly, we find that selected free-form messages and restricted promises achieve similar levels of cooperation. We observe that free-form messages frequently incorporate promises and honesty, which contribute to increased cooperation, while threats do not promote cooperation. Our findings emphasize the crucial role of the self-constructed nature of free-form messages for promoting cooperation, exceeding the impact of message content when compared to restricted communication protocols.

专家简介：

秦向东，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院教授，上海交通大学Smith实验经济学研究中心主任。秦向东的主要研究领域是实验经济学和行为经济学，主要研究项目包括经济决策行为，不完全合同理论等。秦向东的研究成果先后发表于 American Economic Review：Insights；PNAS，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Psychology, Public Choice 等学术期刊。