腾讯会议，会议号：801-869-697

主讲人：金烨

题目：Paternalism in a world of uncertainty: An experimental study

摘要When are people more strongly motivated to intervene in others’ decisions under risk? We consider two dimensions: the difficulty of the decision problems and the informational advantage of the Choice Architect (CA). An easier decision problem, proxied by a larger gap between the expected payoffs of the two options, led to significantly more intervention. In addition, having the opportunity to share private information lowers the intervention from the CA. Moreover, in the information sharing treatment, information sharing and intervention can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the CA’s social preference. We propose a theory of the CA who overestimates the decision errors of the decision maker to describe the CA’s paternalistic behavior.

专家介绍：金烨是上海纽约大学助理教授。她的主要研究方向为行为和实验经济学，研究成果发表于Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, 和Journal of Comparative Economics 等期刊。