题目：Team Incentives and Lower Ability Workers: An Experimental Study on Real-Effort Tasks
主讲人：叶茂亮
时间：2022年9月28日 14：30
地点：腾讯会议：815-269-012
主讲人介绍：叶茂亮，现任南方科技大学商学院副教授（研究员正高职称）、博士生导师、深圳市“鹏城孔雀计划”特聘岗位。获美国哈佛大学公共政策博士，师从Raj Chetty（经济学克拉克奖得主）等著名经济学家，曾任世界银行短期顾问，曾任教于中国人民大学及厦门大学经济学科。主要研究领域为行为与实验经济学、管理经济学、公共政策与政治经济学、劳动与发展经济学；具体而言，在（亲）社会和组织行为、团队协作、社会信任、薪酬激励、分配与再分配、公平感、政府角色、主观福祉、心理健康及相关社会经济政治态度/心理等经济管理议题有深入研究。多篇论文发表于Management Science等管理学、经济学及社会科学顶级和知名国际期刊，在国内外各大高校和知名学术会议报告论文上百次。担任经济学、公共政策、政治学、社会科学领域国内外知名期刊以及国家自然科学基金的匿名评审人，先后主持国家自然科学基金面上项目、中央高校、教育部、广东省和深圳市各类科研项目。
摘要：Team incentives are important in many compensation systems that pay workers according to the output of their team as well as to their own output, with team bonuses often depending on whether the team meets or exceeds specified thresholds. Yet little is known about how team members with different abilities respond to compensation rules and thresholds. We contrast the performance of lower ability participants and higher ability participants in an experiment with three distribution schemes – equal sharing, piece rate sharing, and tournament style winner-takes-all – in settings with and without a team threshold. Workers randomly assigned to equal sharing had higher productivity than those assigned to winner-takes-all and had similar productivity to workers in individual piece-rate scheme with no team element. Output under equal sharing was boosted by the higher productivity of less able workers, possibly motivated by a desire to avoid guilt feelings about letting down their partners, per models of guilt aversion. Given a choice of distribution schemes, participants selected piece rate sharing over equal sharing and favored both of those over winner-takes-all, with persons facing a team threshold evincing greater preference for equal sharing and concern about cooperation in chatting about the teams’ compensation system than others. The findings suggest that organizations with teams of workers with varying abilities are likely to do better if the organization can fully consider lower ability workers’ responsiveness to sharing in rewards, e.g., to have an equal sharing component in its compensation system when they are strongly guilt averse.
